the Satyakaparivarta. 1 I would translate the long name as "The Noble Teaching through
Manifestations on the Subject of Skillful Means in the Bodhisattva's Field of Activity." 2 The doctoral dissertation of Lozang Jamspal contains a translation and study. It is also the subject of a rich research article by Michael Zimmermann, who makes use of the Chinese translations and compares perspectives from the Hindu Arthaśāstra and dharmaśāstras. 3 Lambert Schmithausen mentions it in passing in a sweeping article with which all students of Buddhism and violence should begin. 4 The sūtra was translated twice into Chinese less than a hundred years apart. According to Zimmermann, the chapter on royal ethics is missing in the earliest Chinese translation by Guabhadra. Zimmermann astutely notes that this type of omission does not necessarily indicate that a chapter is a later interpolation into a sūtra. I would add that this is particularly true here, since in China violent or erotic materials were frequently modified or omitted when translating Indian texts.
I will synthesize their contributions and make some observations, corrections, and additions. Dr. Sangye Tandar Naga, the former head of research at the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives in Dharamsala, supported my own study. The merit of this work is largely due to him. 5 Jamspal notes that the text is frequently cited in Indian Buddhist literature. 6 Its most important citation is in the Sūtrasamuccaya attributed to Nāgārjuna. 7 Lindtner takes the attributions of the Sūtrasamuccaya to Nāgārjuna by Candrakīrti and Śāntideva quite seriously, and it has been often used as a key source for dating texts. 8 This would seem to give the Satyakaparivarta an early date. However, dating texts according to their appearance in compendiums such as the Sūtrasamuccaya and Śikāsamuccaya is highly problematic. This type of text, built around a catalog of sūtra citations, is very susceptible to interpolation and sūtras should not be definitively dated to Nāgārjuna based on this alone. However, it is important to note that the section cited by the Sūtrasamuccaya, possibly as early as the second century CE by the enormously influential Nāgārjuna, is from the very section on royal ethics which is not included in Guabhadra's fifth-century Chinese translation. This could mean that the section is not an interpolation into the later version of the sūtra and may have been deliberately excluded by Guabhadra. On the other hand, it could be taken as evidence that the Sūtrasamuccaya itself contains later interpolations. Further, since the internal content of the sūtra was also likely changed, we do not know whether the rest of the chapter that may have been in Nāgārjuna's hands was the same as the one we have today.
When Nāgārjuna addresses royal ethics, as in the Ratnāvalī, he does not directly cite this sūtra. 9 However, this sūtra says many things about military policy and punishment, through the mouth of a manifestation that should not be addressed by an ordained monk such as Nāgārjuna.
The citation in the Śikāsamuccaya, attributed to Śāntideva some 600 years later, also comes from the section on royal ethics. 10 In terms of evaluating the sūtra's currency and influence, particularly the chapter on royal ethics, all we can say is that influential figures in the Mahāyāna tradition believed that its foundational figure, Nāgārjuna, had cited the sūtra. Even if the sūtra evolved and changed, it would have continued to carry this pedigree. Tsong-kha-pa's frequent citations and exhortation to study it seem to suggest that this is true at least in the Tibetan tradition and for the currents of Indian tradition that influenced it. 11 Considering that the extent of Indian Mahāyāna sūtra literature may have been almost as daunting to ancient scholars as it is to modern ones, citation catalogs, such as the Sūtrasamuccaya and Śikāsamuccaya, may have been more important in monastic education than the vast corpus of sūtras themselves. So the Satyakaparivarta's presence there is especially significant. Having stated the qualifications, the best evidence is that this sūtra's section on royal ethics was well known and influential since the second century through the influence of Nāgārjuna and that its absence from the earlier Chinese translation was a deliberate exclusion. However, as usual in Indian Buddhism, the best evidence in such matters is highly subject to doubt.
With apparent humor and irony, this sūtra describes a dialogue between an ascetic called Satyavaca Nirgranthaputra and a king. A character by this name also appears in two Pāli suttas as a clever and aggressive anti-Buddhist debater.
On the Setting
12
The violence of Satyavaca's situation is typical and shows how dangerous the world of the Indian ascetics was imagined to be. Those who lost debates are often described as being swallowed up by the earth, drowning in the Gaga, or spitting up blood and dying. It was not If legend and scripture are any indication, the violence of the Indian Buddhists' imagination, and probably the violence of their world, was extreme. It is no wonder that in Tibet debate has evolved into a highly physical, intellectual martial art.
dynamism, a quality kings are supposed to embody. The epithet Caḍa means Pradyota the Cruel, just as the great Aśoka was called Caḍa-Aśoka. He is a stock character in Buddhist lore.
Zimmermann tracked him down in the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya and describes him as "a mean little bald guy" who would kill anyone "on the spot" who said the word "fat." He was also said to have massacred 80,000 Brāhmaas. 15 He appears elsewhere in Sarvāstivādin avadāna literature in ethical tales focused on violence. In one case, he threatens to kill a Buddhist teacher, and in another, he savagely beats a young novice monk who presumes to teach the women of his court.
Zimmermann notes that the king is described as ruling according to dharma, even though he is also seen as dangerously violent. This illustrates the usual Buddhist attitude of ambiguity toward kings. Aśoka, according to Buddhist legend, slaughtered 18,000 Jains, among other atrocities, well after he became "Dharma-Aśoka." It is not entirely clear, but the irony and absurdity of Satyavaca's encounter suggest a comical aspect. After Satyavaca advises him against capital punishment, the king calls for a public assembly with the Buddha and proclaims that anyone who does not show up will be executed. When Satyavaca criticizes him for being excessively wrathful, Pradyota comes very close to killing him. Satyavaca escapes execution by apologizing for criticizing the king in the presence of others. The situation is perhaps too dangerous and too commonly attested to be 18 humorous. In the Milindapañha, the monk Nāgasena tactfully tells King Milinda that he will only speak to him as a fellow scholar, because disputing with a king can result in punishment. 19 In another case, Śākyamuni is described as avoiding directly confronting even the favorable King
Pasenadi, who was fresh from impaling his enemies, for fear of alienating him. 20 Satyavaca advises Caḍapradyota on criminal justice and military violence. In regard to criminal justice, the ascetic warns the king against excessive compassion. This is the point cited by The Milindapañha, a highly authoritative Theravādin text framed as a dialogue between a king and a monk, offers an interesting contrast by arguing that punitive violence should be capital punishment is ruled out. This is in direct contrast with the dharmaśāstras, compendiums of Hindu ethical thought, which generally advocate all three acts of violence. Permanent physical damage should be avoided in such harsh treatment, and such violence should be done with the intention of training the victim. Violence is a tool of both prevention and rehabilitation.
Likewise, in the case of tax collection, a king should discern between those who are unable to pay by no fault of their own and those who evade taxes or squander their wealth.
understood as the fruition of the victim's own karma. How, the monk Nāgasena is asked, is a king to reconcile the Buddha's apparently contradictory injunctions not to harm anyone, on the one hand, and to punish those who deserve it, on the other? King Milinda pointedly reminds him that punishment includes amputation, mutilation, torture, and execution. Nāgasena affirms both teachings. If a robber deserves death, he should be put to death. Is, then, the execution of criminals part of the dharma laid down by the Tathāgatas? No, it is the robber's own karma that causes the execution, not the Buddhadharma. 23 The king merely facilitates this fruition. This concept of the king facilitating the fruition of negative karma is also prominent in the Hindu dharmaśāstras, which are based more on the logic of ascetic expiation of karma. In Hindu sources, the king functions as Yama, lord of death and dispenser of karmic outcomes. 24 The domination of vassals is spoken of in much the same terms as controlling criminals, and the sūtra's arguments for the benevolent treatment of vassals are more pragmatic than naïvely idealistic. Compassion is generally understood in Buddhism as having a magical power to protect. The common description of bodhisattvas putting on the armor of compassion is more than metaphorical. One can cite many cases of saints being protected from assassins or vicious Even the death penalty can be seen as a benefit from this perspective. The victim is benefited through relief of a karmic burden. The Satyakaparivarta argues instead that compassionate torture that does not result in permanent physical damage may have a beneficial influence on the character of the victim. The death penalty is not allowed, perhaps partly because it disallows the possibility of reform. Although the royal use of deadly force in battle is not explicitly described as an enactment of karmic outcomes, the sūtra says that weapons cannot harm a warrior protected by good karma. The unstated implications are that one's victims must be ripe for their own destruction, and losing suggests moral failure on the part of the loser.
animals by manifesting compassion. Even today, the Mettā Sutta is recited to protect from snakebite and other dangers. The Milindapañha tells of a prince, renowned for his compassion, who was struck by an arrow only precisely when he allowed his concentration on compassion to lapse.
The Seyya Jātaka, a story about one of the Buddha's previous rebirths, portrays an extreme example of a king who refuses to fight to protect his kingdom, because it will require him to do harm. While imprisoned by the victor, he pities his conqueror for the karmic outcomes of his actions. His captor is then attacked by great physical pain through the power of his victim's compassion. As a result, the king is released and his kingdom is returned (Jātaka 282).
The implication is that compassion magically serves to sustain a king's power. Similarly, it is believed in this sūtra that the weather, public health, and agricultural productivity are enhanced by the power of compassion. values is a fundamental source of the well-being of a people. The concern with karmic merit goes beyond the impact of ascetic values on popular culture to a highly pragmatic and self-interested concern for community well-being. In the same way, the Buddhist ethics of violence represents more than a simple allegiance to the values of ascetics. They are part of a comprehensive view of human thriving that values worldly abundance.
But in this sūtra, as even in the brutally pragmatic Hindu Arthaśāstra, there are also practical arguments for the protective power of justice and benevolence that go beyond the usual magical sense. A king must recognize that his own policies are a substantial cause of hostile relations and that his own virtue is his first defense, reasoning that has currently been used in regard to the rise of terrorism. In an argument reminiscent of the Aggañña Sutta's claim that crime arises from poverty, it is stated here that enemy attacks and insurrections arise from unhappiness and dissatisfaction. A king is therefore indirectly protected by his benevolent cultivation of the well-being of his subjects, vassals, and neighbors. It is emphasized that, if they are happy and secure then, instead of becoming enemies, they will be allies when enemies do arise. In the same way, a benevolent king will successfully enrich his treasury through gifts and the general prosperity of his realm, while a rapacious and exploitive king will fail. 28 Compassion serves the purposes of domination, pacification, security, and enrichment.
Although the sūtra allows for war, it does so only under special conditions and with special restrictions on its conduct. In a graded series of skillful means, a king must first try to befriend, then to help, and then to intimidate his potential enemy before resorting to war. This set of four stratagems diverges from an ancient and pervasive set only by substituting "intimidation" for "fomenting dissension."
On Warfare 29 In Hindu sources, this common argument that war should be a last resort is grounded on the practical point that battle is highly unreliable and unpredictable. So we cannot simply assume, in this Buddhist context, that using war as a last resort is a moral issue. In Hindu contexts, the preliminary techniques are often not attempts to avoid conflict, but to win by safer means. It is not clear in this sūtra whether wars of aggression are acceptable or not. There is no explicit rejection of campaigns of conquest. It should be remembered that, in the dharmaśāstra literature, all of the activities of kings are regarded and referred to as "protection."
So, references to protection do not necessarily refer to defensive activity.
Should attempts to succeed without armed conflict fail, the king is then instructed in how to assemble and deploy the various divisions of an army. He is to go to war with three intentions: The jātakas frequently valorize intentions to capture the enemy alive or to win without bloodshed through intimidation (Jātaka 229, 230, 181). In comparing this sūtra to the Arthaśāstra literature, which for him includes the Manusmti and the dharmaśāstras, Zimmermann states, "There can be hardly any doubt that the main effort of the warrior must have been directed towards annihilation of the enemy." 30 However, the Arthaśāstra, Manusmti, Dharmasūtras, and Śāntiparvan of the Mahābhārata all agree that noncombatants, or those surrendering, fallen, disarmed, fleeing, or petrified by fear, shall not be harmed. 31 Bhīṣma, the great katriya guru of the Mahābhārata, proclaims that a warrior should only fight for the sake of conquest, not out of wrath.
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The concern to care for life in the sūtra also includes the well-being of all innocents, including animals and the spirits that dwell in trees and water. In contrast to most Hindu dharmaśāstras, the sūtra forbids burning homes or cities, destroying reservoirs or orchards, or confiscating the harvest. This condition is extended to what might be called infrastructure in general, i.e., "all things well developed and constructed."
Having come to war with these preconditions and restrictions, the king still faces a problem that If he does so with compassionate intentions, a king may make great merit through warfare, so warfare becomes auspicious. The same argument was made earlier in relation to torture, and the sūtra now proceeds to make commonsense analogies to doctors and to parents who 34 compassionately inflict pain in order to discipline and heal without intending harm.
Zimmermann expresses surprise at the reference to compassion here and describes it as an irrelevant "sporadic addition," out of keeping with the context. The sūtra, he says, fails to address the "obvious contradiction between his obligation to protect sentient beings . . . and his warfare activities." He states that "the pair 'killing with compassion' was incompatible with the basic Buddhist ethics."
Based on a similar perspective, Davidson argues that Buddhists were ultimately unable to find a satisfactory answer to the conundrum of how to uncompromisingly stand by their pacifist values without alienating or disempowering the kings upon whom they depended for endowment and protection. 35 36 He refers to a much-discussed passage from the Bodhisattvabhūmi, supporting compassionate killing, as an example of the fact that Buddhism was "not unequivocal" in its pacifism. 37 He sees this as an equivocation based on two assumptions which have been common to the field of Buddhist studies. The first is that this is an isolated passage representing an exceptional view. It has also been more expansively asserted, "Needless to say, this stance is particularly favored by the Consciousness-Only school and in esoteric Buddhism." 38 However, the Mādhyamika thinkers Bhāviveka, Candrakīrti, and Śāntideva all agree on the basic point that
bodhisattvas may do what is ordinarily forbidden or inauspicious, including killing, and make merit as long as they remain compassionate. 39 In the Śikṣāsamuccaya, Śāntideva says that the very things that send others to hell send a bodhisattva to the heavenly Brahmalokas, a traditional result of generating compassion. 40 The validation of compassionate violence made by Asaga here is found across Mahāyāna traditions and is common to its ethics, not an unusual exception to normative pacifism.
Second, Asaga's passage is misread as an ethic of self-sacrifice which "allows the bodhisattva to engage in the slaughter of thieves or brigands . . . so that the bodhisattva could go to hell instead of the criminals"; "the bodhisattva replaces himself for the other and suffers in his stead." 41 Obviously, this would be a problematic model for a king. First, it should be noted that Asaga recommends stealing from thieves. Killing is for the purpose of preventing crimes, with similar karmic results. It is true that Asaga says that the bodhisattva killer is compassionately freeing his victim from the karmic outcome of great crimes and has the wish that he, rather than the criminal, should be born in hell. However, he goes on to explain that the result of killing with this intention, far from going to hell, is that the bodhisattva actually becomes blameless and produces great merit (Skt. anāpattiko bhavati bahu ca puyaṃ prasūyate) exactly as in the Satyakaparivarta.
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Asaga's conception of compassionate violence validates not only the prevention of terrible crimes, but also the aggressive removal of vicious rulers from power, a motivation that could be very important for kings:
One could say that the more willing bodhisattvas are to go to hell, the more certain it is that they will not.
Likewise, the [karmic] outcome for a bodhisattva established in compassionate intentions for benefit and happiness, who removes from power kings or ministers who are excessively fierce, merciless and solely set out to afflict others, is that they generate great merit. 43 Davidson goes on to say, "This same rubric allows wide latitude in questionable behavior," and "evidently this doctrinal basis was used to justify belligerence on the part of their favorite monarchs." 44 He gives the example of the Chinese pilgrim Hsüan-tsang's depiction of King
Hara. However, Hsüan-tsang records neither Asaga's actual argument that Hara should invoke compassion toward his enemy, nor the argument based on the reading that he should willingly enter hell. The story depicts Hara as oppressed by a vicious anti-Buddhist enemy who killed his father. In his distress, Hara supplicates the celestial bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara with prayers and offerings. 45 Davidson intends to support the argument that there was a fundamental conflict in
Buddhist support for violence. But Asaga's argument for compassionate violence is broadly and authoritatively attested in Mahāyāna literature. It is not an ethics of self-sacrifice, but one that offers merit for killing. This sūtra is somewhat more expansive in explicitly making compassionate killing an option not just for bodhisattvas, but also for kings. There is no sign that the kings addressed by this sūtra were regarded as bodhisattvas, quite the opposite; and one has to assume that the king's entire army, and those who enforced his punishments, would be implicated in his karmic situation and the logic of making merit through compassionate killing.
Tantric literature, which was used in the royal cult in later Indian Buddhism, supplemented the show a concern for defense, political stability, and social order through a combination of harshness and benevolence. These resources offer techniques for removing and preventing the causes of hostility, but fully empower the use of warfare when it is deemed appropriate and necessary. Military readiness and intimidation are important elements of a king's responsibilities.
Violence is an important tool for criminal rehabilitation, social stability, and military defense. In the course of orally presenting this research at conferences and in university lecture series, I have experienced how distressing it can be for Buddhists that compassionate warfare and torture could be advocated in Buddhist scriptures. I would ask those who find this disturbing to also consider that these texts advocate that warfare should only be pursued when all other means have failed; that benevolence is a state's first defense; that we must take responsibility for exploitation, which creates our enemies; that physical punishment may only be undertaken from a compassionate intention to benefit the recipient; that the destruction of infrastructure and the natural environment is a mistaken policy; and, above all, that a nation will thrive or fall based upon its capacity for compassion, rather than on the ethics of self-or national interest.
